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Abstract
We consider a game in which each player must find a compromise
between more daring strategies that carry a high risk for him to be
eliminated, and more cautious ones that, however, reduce his final
score. For two symmetric players this game was originally formulated
in 1961 by Dresher, who modeled a duel between two opponents. The
game has also been of interest in the description of athletic competi-
tions. We extend here the two-player game to an arbitrary number N
of symmetric players. We show that there is a mixed-strategy Nash
equilibrium and find its exact analytic expression, which we analyze in
particular in the limit of large N , where mean-field behavior occurs.
The original game with N = 2 arises as a singular limit of the general
case.
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1 Introduction
The interest of physicists in game theory is increasing. The role of this theory
in population dynamics, phase transitions, and other traditional areas of
statistical physics is by now well-documented (see, e.g. [1]); and the new field
of quantum games (see e.g. [2, 3, 4]) is blossoming. Moreover, the methods
of statistical physics combined with those of game theory find applications
in other areas of science such as information theory [5], linguistics [6], and
the social sciences [7].
Game theory and statistical physics are both probabilistic and their meth-
ods meet whenever there is a large number N of participating players. The
players will typically be particles in the case of statistical physics, may rep-
resent economic agents in an application to economics, or be still some other
kind of fundamental entity in yet another domain of application.
In this short paper we consider N equivalent players j = 1, 2, . . . , N
participating in a game that obeys the following rules.
1. Each player j chooses an xj in the real interval [0, 1], called his strategy
space.
2. Player j is randomly eliminated from the game with probability xj .
3. Among the players not eliminated, the one having the largest xj is
the winner; any tie is broken randomly. If it so happens that all players are
eliminated, the winner is chosen at random among them.
4. The winner gains a payoff N − 1, all others lose 1. Hence this is a
zero-sum game.
A mathematically important feature of this game is the discontinuity
of the payoff as a function of (x1, . . . , xN ): the winner’s profit drops dis-
continuously when his score decreases continuously below the score of the
runner-up.
This model was originally formulated for N = 2 by Dresher [8] and meant
to represent a duel between two opponents. Another interpretation [9] is that
of a running competition in which runner j invests an “energy”xj . The more
energy he invests, the higher his risk of being eliminated (say, by exhaustion
or any other kind of misfortune beyond his control), but also the higher his
chances of winning if not eliminated. Of course such simple models do not
do justice to the details of any specific competition; however, they serve to
bring out a few general principles that play a role.
Let us look at, say, player j. A strategy of player j is a probability
distribution fj(xj) on [0, 1] from which at each round of the game he chooses
an xj randomly and independently. If fj(xj) = δ(xj−Xj) for someXj ∈ [0, 1],
we say that player j has the pure strategy Xj; in all other cases we call
his strategy mixed. A set
(
f ∗1 (x1), . . . , f
∗
N(xN)
)
of N strategies is called a
Nash equilibrium if none of the players can improve his gain by unilaterally
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deviating from his strategy while all others stick to theirs.
We will show by explicit construction that the game presented above
possesses a symmetric Nash equilibrium, i.e., one in which f ∗j (x) = f∗(x) for
all j = 1, 2, . . . , N . For short and with a slight abuse of language we will also
refer to f∗(x) as the Nash equilibrium of the game. By symmetry we then
know that in such a symmetric equilibrium the expected gain for any one
player is zero. However, finding f∗(x) is a nontrivial problem that cannot be
solved by symmetry considerations alone.
For N = 2 this game has become a textbook example. Its solution is [8]
f∗(x) =


1
4(1− x)3
, 0 ≤ x ≤ 2
3
,
0, 2
3
< x ≤ 1.
(1.1)
The fact that there should exist an interval where f∗(x) = 0 is particularly
unintuitive.
In recent work [9] the N = 2 game was extended to two asymmetric
players, for which the Nash equilibrium is a pair
(
f ∗1 (x1), f
∗
2 (x2)
)
of distinct
functions. In this note we extend the Nash equilibrium solution (1.1) to the
case of N > 2 symmetric players. Such multi-player games typically lead
to nonlinear problems and we are not aware of the existence of any analytic
solutions of the kind that we present here. Simplified but exactly solvable
models as this one may illustrate general principles or simply be of interest for
their own sake; depending on the context they may also serve as paradigms
or as testing grounds for numerical methods.
Before entering upon the actual calculation we will in the following two
subsections discuss two particular aspects of this problem.
1.1 Discontinuous games
The important subclass of symmetric N -player games was considered as early
as 1951 by Nash [10]. Since then, mainstream literature, spread across many
areas of science, has dealt with proving the existence of Nash equilibria under
a diversity of conditions, developing search algorithms, and studying their
algorithmic complexity (see e.g. [11]). Usually, such work first focuses on
games with a discrete strategy space (see e.g. [12]), continuous strategy
spaces such as the interval [0, 1] being much harder to study. The difficulty
still increases considerably when, as is the case here, the payoff function has
discontinuities, in which case one speaks of a “discontinuous game.”
Under certain broad conditions [13], among which continuity of the pay-
off function, symmetric N -player games with continuous strategy spaces are
known to admit symmetric pure -strategy Nash equilibria. This existence is
no longer guaranteed when the payoff function has a discontinuity. In fact, we
know that for N = 2 the game studied in this work has no pure-strategy Nash
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equilibrium. Worse, some symmetric games fail to have symmetric equilibria
altogether, although they may have asymmetric ones, as was shown [14] for
two-player games. Several of these existence results appear to carry over [15]
to games with lower than full permutational N -player symmetry.
It is easy to see that the game studied here cannot have a symmetric pure-
strategy Nash equilibrium. Suppose that f∗(x) = δ(x−X∗) were one. If all
players played this strategy, then each of them would have an expected gain
equal to zero. However, if player 1 were to shift his strategy from x1 = X∗
to x1 = X∗ + ǫ for an arbitrarily small ǫ > 0, then his probability of being
eliminated would increase negligibly whereas if not eliminated he would be
sure to win. Hence he would increase his expected gain, contrary to what
was supposed.
1.2 Large-N limit
In statistical physics a mean-field theory for an N -component system is one
in which in the large-N limit each of the N components (atoms, spins, . . . )
is subject only to a suitably defined average effect of the other components.
Depending on the model, mean-field equations may sometimes be derived ex-
actly, and sometimes require approximations to be made. Mean-field theory
has often been the first, and sometimes the only possible, method to answer
new questions in physics. From a statistical physics point of view, one may
expect – and we will confirm this below – that for large N a symmetric
N -player game can be described by mean-field equations.
Our work may be seen against the background of what are commonly
called “mean-field games” (MFG), even though it does not itself belong to
that class. MFG games are based on mean-field ideas from physics that
were initially brought to bear on game theory by Lasry and Lions [16] and
by Huang et al. [17]. These authors considered a set of N time evolution
equations in which the strategy of each player is a time-dependent control
function. Each player’s payoff functional depends continuously on the control
function and the system has a pure-strategy Nash equilibrium.
Recent additions to this MFG class of games are due to Degond et al. [7],
who aim at an application to the social sciences, and to Swiecicki et al. [18]
and Ullmo et al. [19], who establish a connection between MFG and various
equations of physics. Explicit solutions of certain specific MFG were given
by Bardi [20]. The convergence, as N → ∞, of the Nash equilibrium of
a symmetric N -player game to the solution of the limiting MFG has been
addressed by Fischer [21].
We may, perhaps, view the results of this note as a first step towards
constructing the solution of a MFG with discontinuous payoffs. These in-
clude games where the winner from among a large number N of competitors
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takes all the profit, as does the gold medalist in, for example, a multi-runner
marathon.
2 Payoff in a single round and expected gain
2.1 Payoff functions Gj(x1, x2, . . . , xN)
In a single round of the game, let theN players choose strategies x1, x2, . . . ,xN
from given distributions f1(x1), . . . , fN(xN ). Consider an arbitrary player,
say player 1, and write G1(x1, x2, . . . , xN) for his payoff averaged over the
random elimination process. We then have
G1(x1, x2, . . . , xN ) = P (x1, x2, . . . , xN )× (N − 1) +Q(x1, x2, . . . , xN)× (−1)
= NP (x1, x2, . . . , xN)− 1, (2.1)
in which P and Q = 1 − P are the elimination averaged probabilities for
player 1 to win and to lose, leading to payoffs N − 1 and −1, respectively.
In order to establish the explicit expression for the probability P (x1, x2,. . . , xN)
that player 1 be the winner given x1, x2, . . . , xN , we must sum over all differ-
ent subgroups of noneliminated players. For n = 0, 1, . . . , N − 1, let Jn be a
subset of n elements of the set of indices {2, 3, . . . , N}. We then have
P (x1, x2, . . . , xN ) = (1− x1)
N−1∑
n=0
∑
Jn
[∏
j∈Jn
(1− xj)θ(x1 − xj)
]∏
j /∈Jn
j>1
xj


+
1
N
x1
N∏
j=2
xj , (2.2)
where we define the Heaviside step function by θ(x) = 0 for x ≤ 0 and
θ(x) = 1 for x > 0. In equation (2.2) the first term on the RHS accounts
for all different ways for player 1 to win without being eliminated, and the
second one represents his probability of winning when he himself, as well as
all the other N − 1 players, are eliminated. For n = 0 the only possibility
for J0 is to be the empty set and the product on j ∈ J0 is equal to unity;
similarly, for n = N − 1 the product on j /∈ JN−1 equals unity.
As is clear from the rules of the game stated in the introduction, equation
(2.2) for P is valid only when x1 is nondegenerate with any of the other xj .
The expression for P in the degenerate case, although easily written down,
will not be needed if we decide to limit our considerations to mixed strategies
fj(xj) that are sufficiently smooth functions of their argument; in that case
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degeneracies occur with probability zero and do not contribute to any of the
calculations.
When (2.2) is substituted in (2.1) we obtain the payoff function for player
1. The payoff Gj(x1, x2, . . . , xN) for the jth player results from a simple
permutation of indices. The functions Gj fully define the game.
If we specialize to N = 2 we obtain from (2.2) and (2.1) that
G1(x1, x2) =
{
−1 + 2x2 − x1x2 , x1 < x2 ,
1− 2x1 + x1x2 , x1 > x2 , N = 2,
(2.3)
which is the example due to Dresher [8].
2.2 Expected gain G1[x1; f ]
Suppose now that the players 2, 3, . . . , N all adopt the same (sufficiently
smooth, but otherwise arbitrary) strategy f(x) and that player 1 chooses a
specific x1 ∈ [0, 1]. Let G1[x1; f ] denote player 1’s expected gain when the
game is repeated over many rounds under these circumstances, that is, the
overbar denotes the average with respect to the strategies f(x2), f(x3), . . . , f(xN)
of the other N − 1 players. Using (2.1) we may also write
G1[x1; f ] = NP [x1; f ]− 1, (2.4)
in which
P [x1; f ] =
∫
dx2 f(x2)...
∫
dxN f(xN )P (x1, x2, . . . , xN )
= (1− x1)
N−1∑
n=0
∑
Jn
[∫ x1
0
dx (1− x)f(x)
]n [∫ 1
0
dxxf(x)
]N−1−n
+
1
N
x1
[∫ 1
0
dxxf(x)
]N−1
= (1− x1)
[∫ x1
0
dx (1− x)f(x) +
∫ 1
0
dxxf(x)
]N−1
+
1
N
x1
[∫ 1
0
dxxf(x)
]N−1
.
(2.5)
Here, in going from the first to the second line, we employed (2.2), and to go
from the second to the third one we used that the sum on Jn simply leads
to an extra factor
(
N−1
n
)
. Equation (2.5) brings out that the strategy x1 of
player 1 is coupled to two (N − 1)th powers representing the N − 1 other
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players, but in which their individuality has disappeared. This property will
ensure straightforwardly that for N →∞ this game has a mean-field limit.
We rewrite (2.5) as
P [x; f ] = (1− x)UN−1(x) +
1
N
xV N−1 , 0 ≤ x ≤ 1, (2.6)
where we introduced the abbreviations
U(x) =
∫ x
0
ds (1− s)f(s) +
∫ 1
0
ds sf(s), 0 ≤ x ≤ 1, (2.7)
V ≡ U(0) =
∫ 1
0
ds sf(s). (2.8)
The constant V is the average fraction of times that a player adopting the
mixed strategy f(x) is eliminated. For later reference we observe that
U ′(x) = (1− x)f(x), 0 ≤ x ≤ 1, (2.9)
where the prime denotes differentiation with respect to x.
3 Equation for the Nash equilibrium f∗(x)
3.1 Equation for f∗(x) and its solution
Game theory tells us that if f∗(x) is a Nash equilibrium, then the expected
gain G1[x1; f∗] is equal to some constant K for all x1 in the support of f∗
(written ‘supp f∗’), i.e. all x1 having f∗(x1) > 0. If such were not the case,
player 1 could increase his expected gain by putting more weight on the
values of x1 leading to a higher payoff. The symmetry between the N players
dictates that G1[x1; f∗] = K = 0, and consequently, by (2.4), we have that
P [x1; f∗] = N
−1 for x1 ∈ supp f∗.
We must be prepared for the possibility that supp f∗ is only a subinterval
of [0, 1]. Let us assume, therefore, that there exists an interval on which
f∗(x) is positive, continuous, and sufficiently differentiable. Then, knowing
the value 1/N of P [x1; f∗] on this interval, we must have
(1− x)UN−1
∗
(x) +
1
N
xV N−1
∗
=
1
N
, x ∈ supp f∗ , (3.1)
in which U∗ and V∗ are given by (2.7) and (2.8) but with f∗ instead of f . We
will attempt to find f∗(x) by the method [8] that worked for the case N = 2.
Differentiating (3.1) once with respect to x and using (2.9) gives
− UN−1
∗
(x) + (N − 1)(1− x)2f∗(x)U
N−2
∗
(x) +
1
N
V N−1
∗
= 0, (3.2)
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Differentiating once more and dividing by (N − 1)(1− x)UN−3
∗
(x) yields[
− 3f∗(x) + (1− x)f
′
∗
(x)
]
U∗(x) + (N − 2)(1− x)
2f 2
∗
(x) = 0. (3.3)
For N = 2 the second term on the LHS of (3.3) is absent and we have a
linear first-order ordinary differential equation (ODE) for f∗(x) that is easily
solved and in the end produces the well-known result (1.1).
From here on we will consider the more complicated case N > 2. We
proceed by solving U∗(x) from (3.3) in terms of f∗(x) and f
′
∗
(x), differentiate
the resulting equality once more, and use (2.9). This leads to
(1− x)f∗(x) = (N − 2)
d
dx
(1− x)2f 2
∗
(x)
3f∗(x)− (1− x)f ′∗(x)
, (3.4)
which amounts to a nonlinear second-order ODE for f∗(x). Equation (3.4)
may be cast in several other forms, but we will not do so here. We just
observe that its homogeneity in f∗ facilitates its analysis. One may check by
substitution that this equation has the solution
f∗(x) =
C
(1− x)3−b(1 +B − x)b
, b ≡
N − 2
N − 1
, (3.5)
which depends on the two constants of integration C > 0 and B. Equa-
tions (3.2) through (3.5), which have been derived from (3.1), are valid for
x ∈ supp f∗.
We now observe that the solution (3.5) is not integrable at x = 1 and,
guided by the solution for the case N = 2, take this as an indication that the
support of f∗ is an interval [0, a] with a < 1. The integrations in (2.7) and
(2.8) then run effectively until the upper limit x = a and the normalization
condition is U∗(a) = 1.
3.2 Support of f∗(x)
The solution f∗(x) depends on the constants C, B, and a, which we will now
determine by making sure that equations (3.3), (3.2), and (3.1) are satisfied.
When equation (3.5) for f∗(x) together with the explicit expression for b is
substituted in (3.3), we may solve for U∗(x) and find
U∗(x) = (N − 1)
C
B
(
1 +B − x
1− x
) 1
N−1
. (3.6)
Since U∗(x) > 0, we now see that B > 0.
The normalization condition U∗(a) = 1 leads together with (3.6) to an
expression for the normalization constant in terms of a and B, viz.
C =
B
N − 1
(
1− a
1 +B − a
) 1
N−1
, (3.7)
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which when combined with (3.6) gives
U∗(x) =
(
1− a
1− x
) 1
N−1
(
1 +B − x
1 +B − a
) 1
N−1
(3.8)
and in particular
V∗ = U∗(0) =
[
(1 +B)(1− a)
1 +B − a
] 1
N−1
. (3.9)
The remaining unknowns are a and B.
When (3.8) and (3.9) are substituted in (3.2) we find that this equation
is satisfied at the condition that
B = N − 1. (3.10)
This leaves the support size a as the only undetermined parameter. We now
return to (3.1), in which we substitute the results (3.8) for U∗(x) and (3.9)
for V∗, as well as (3.7) and (3.10) for C and B. It then appears after some
algebra that we must have
a =
N
N + 1
. (3.11)
We remark that we could not have determined the parameter a this way if
in (3.1) we had not exploited the fact that the expected gain K vanishes due
to symmetry between all players. When (3.10) and (3.11) are used in (3.7)
and (3.9), we find that
C = N−
2
N−1 , (3.12)
V∗ = N
−
1
N−1 . (3.13)
After substituting expressions (3.10)-(3.12) for B, a, and C in (3.5) we find
that the Nash equilibrium f∗(x) is given by
f∗(x) =


1/
[
N2−2b(1− x)3−b(N − x)b
]
, 0 ≤ x ≤ a,
0, a < x ≤ 1,
(3.14)
with b = N−2
N−1
and a = N
N+1
. This is the main result of this note. Equa-
tion(3.14) has been derived for N > 2. Nevertheless, when in it we set
N = 2, the equation reduces to the Nash equilibrium (1.1) of the two-player
game. Figure 1 shows the function f∗(x) given by (3.14) for N = 2, 3, 4, 5, 6.
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Figure 1: The Nash equilibrium (3.14) for N = 2, 3, 4, 5, 6.
3.3 Completing the proof
In order to prove that this is a true Nash equilibrium we have to check one
more thing. We should verify that when player 1 chooses a strategy x1 in
the interval a < x1 ≤ 1, while all other players j = 2, 3, . . . , N stick to the
strategy f∗(xj), then the expected gain of player 1 is less than 0. That is, we
have to show that
P [x1; f∗] <
1
N
, a < x1 ≤ 1. (3.15)
To do so we return to expression (2.6) for P [x1; f∗]. We observe that for x1 >
a the two integrations in (2.7) run until x = a, so that U∗(x1) = U∗(a) = 1.
Then (2.6) becomes
P [x1; f∗] = (1− x1)× 1 +
1
N
x1 ×
1
N
= 1− (1−N−2)x1,
<
1
N
for N
N+1
< x1 ≤ 1, (3.16)
which is the final step in proving that we found a Nash equilibrium.
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*
(x)
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N =   5
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N =  ∞
Figure 2: The Nash equilibrium shown for N = 2, 5, 10, 20 as a function of the
scaling variable ξ = (x− a)N . For large N the equilibrium approaches the scaling
function F(ξ) (heavy black curve marked N =∞) given by equation (3.19).
3.4 Scaling in the large-N limit
3.4.1 Scaling of the distribution
We study the limit of large N in greater detail. It appears that as N → ∞
the Nash equilibrium f∗(x) has almost all its weight concentrated in a region
of width ∼ N−1 just below x = a. We therefore consider the scaling limit
N →∞, x− a→ 0, ξ ≡ (x− a)N fixed, (3.17)
in which ξ is nonpositive. An elementary calculation shows that in this limit
lim
scaling
N−1f∗(x)dx ≡ F(ξ) dξ (3.18)
with
F(ξ) =
1
(1− ξ)2
, −∞ < ξ ≤ 0, (3.19)
which satisfies the normalization
∫ 0
−∞
dξF(ξ) = 1. Figure 2 shows how the
Nash equilibria tend to their scaling limit as N gets large. The function
F(ξ) = 1/(1− ξ)2 rightfully deserves the name “mean-field strategy.”
3.4.2 Scaling of the average
The average 〈x〉 of x represents the average fraction of times that a player
is eliminated. We are interested in the large-N limit of this quantity with
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respect to the Nash equilibrium distribution.
Although we have the exact relation 〈x〉 = a + 〈ξ〉/N , the average of ξ
with respect to F(ξ) does not exist and we need to reconsider how to take
the large-N limit. The fast way to find the answer is to use (2.8) and to
observe that in the Nash equilibrium we have 〈x〉 = V∗ for all N , with V∗
given by (3.13). We therefore deduce the large-N expansion
〈x〉 = V∗ = 1 −
logN
N
+O
(
log2N
N2
)
, N →∞. (3.20)
This brings out quantitatively a lesson that was qualitatively intuitive: as the
numberN of players increases, each player must take higher risks to maximize
his chances to win. He does so by choosing strategies closer and closer to
unity. Since the elimination process acts on each player independently, in
a single round of the game there will be typically only
(
1 − 〈x〉
)
N ∼ logN
noneliminated players.
Although true, it would clearly be an unhelpful oversimplification to state
that for N →∞ the Nash equilibrium converges toward a Dirac delta func-
tion at x = 1. What matters is the approach to this limit, and we have shown
in this section that that approach is nontrivial.
4 Conclusion
We have in this work generalized one of the simplest discontinuous two-
player games to an arbitrary number N of symmetric players, each having
a strategy space [0, 1]. We showed by construction that this game has a
symmetric Nash equilibrium f(x) on [0, 1] and we presented its fully explicit
analytic expression for all finite N = 2, 3, 4, . . .. We found that in the limit
N → ∞ the Nash equilibrium takes a scaling form that depends only on a
single combination ξ of x and N . As had to be expected, when the number
N of players increases the Nash equilibrium shifts to higher values of x.
Nevertheless, in the general case, just as for N = 2, there is an interval
(1− 1
N+1
, 1] in which no player can profitably choose his strategy.
The original N = 2 solution due to Dresher [8] appears in this work as a
singular limit of the general N case,
We were motivated by our interest [9] in describing an athletic competi-
tion, e.g. between runners or cyclists. In the present description the athletes
do not interact otherwise than probabilistically. One of our future goals is
to incorporate a physical interaction between the competitors, such as the
effect of slipstreaming, and to see if in that case a similar fully analyzable
game can be formulated.
In another direction, it would be interesting to describe a competition
in which each player adapts his strategy in a time-dependent way. For a
12
large number N of players this would naturally lead us to the problem of
formulating a mean-field game with discontinuous payoff.
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